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The economic design of a potential tradable permit system for SO2 
emissions in the European Union1 
 





Acid air pollution has been considered an important international policy issue since the early 
70s. In Europe, several initiatives have been taken to abate acid emissions, by focusing first on 
SO2. Following the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP), that was developed in the framework of the UNECE, the European Commission 
implemented a policy of abatement of sulphur emissions to air from power generation and 
industrial sources, with the Directive on Large Combustion Plants (LCPD). Two LRTAP 
protocols have been successively agreed upon : Helsinki (1985) leading to the so-called 30% 
abatement club, and Oslo (1994), that defined new, differentiated, national targets for SO2 
abatement on the top of emission standards for sources and agreed specifications of the best 
available technologies to be used by operators. The agreed long run objective3, not addressed 
by agreed abatements targets and timetables, is to reduce SO2 emissions in a way that acid 
deposits will be below the 5-percentile critical loads identified for each unit zone in Europe4. 
Up to now, regulatory requirements agreed upon within the Protocol are not providing the 
                                                 
1.- This article is based on a study done in 1996 by the authors for the DGII. See Cros and Godard (1996). 
2.- Respectively research assistant and director of research, International Centre for Research on Environment 
and Development (CIRED), a joint unit of CNRS and EHESS, 19 Rue Amélie F-75007 PARIS. 
3.- Article 2 of the Oslo Protocol states that Parties should take any possible measures not entailing excessive 
costs to limit their acid deposits in the long run under the sulphur critical loads. The European Community has 
endorsed the same long run objective "of no exceedance ever of critical loads and levels" in its 
5th Environmental programme adopted in 1993. 
4.- In the context of this article, each time a territorial dimension is implied, ‘Europe’ or ‘European’ should be 
understood as the whole European territory concerned by the Oslo Protocol, i.e. including non EU parts. ‘EU’ 
then refers to the territory of the present member countries of the European Union. 
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means to reach this long term objective. Introducing new policy instruments or significantly 
tightening existing ones will be necessary to reduce the gap. 
The aim of this article is to provide a broad outline of, and to make suggestions about, 
the possible use of SO2-related allowance trading as a policy instrument to be adopted by the 
European Union (EU), in order to implement a cost-efficient move towards the long term goal 
of respecting acid critical loads everywhere in the EU. The expected transition will be 
sufficiently long to make it profitable to pay for the initial organisational investment required 
for the development of trading schemes. 
Our main goal is to envisage trading solutions which fit the essential features of the 
present institutional context of the European acidification game, that combines EU and 
international (UNECE) features5. More specifically, we take the LRTAP Protocol of Oslo as 
granted, regarding its main rationale.6 This framework allows some margin in using economic 
instruments, but poses constraints that rules for emissions trading should meet. Namely we 
interpret this Protocol as providing two main constraints: 
• national emissions caps for stationary sources have been agreed on according to a timetable 
specifying targets for several years (2000, 2005, 2010); 
• deposition caps for each unit zone of a European territorial grid should be respected 
according to a 60% abatement target -as a first step- in the gap between current deposits 
and the 5-percentile critical loads. 
The second constraint is not formulated as such in the Protocol, but results from the 
way differentiated national targets have been arrived at, and from the expected rules which 
will be imposed on joint implementation. It introduces a major departure from what has been 
the main experiment in SO2 trading, i.e. the Acid Rain Program developed in the USA since 
the 1990 Amendments of the Clean Air Act: a national market for SO2 allowances has been 
set up, on the top of local regulations aiming at local environmental protection, for the whole 
territory, from Boston to Los Angeles; provided that local regulations are met, SO2 trading can 
be achieved without any specific constraint of location (Godard, 1994 ; Rico, 1995). 
Although no existing policy and measures can guarantee the respect of both 
constraints, the challenge our proposals try to take up is to design trading schemes which fits 
                                                 
5.- As is well known, switching from national to international contexts involves not only changing territorial 
scales, but the very nature of the co-ordination problem (Godard, 1992; OECD, 1992a). In a national context, a 
State administration is supposed to have the capacity to enforce a new law on every citizen, even those who feel 
themselves to be net losers from the change of law. In an international context, a new rule has to be accepted by 
each Party and there is a severe problem of potential free-riding. In the context of the EU, the situation is 
intermediate, depending on the nature of the issue and the type of voting procedure (unanimity or majority). 
6.- By March 1997, only four countries had formally ratified this Protocol: Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. This number is insufficient to give it any binding legal value. The assumption supporting the article is 
that this Protocol will eventually be enforced. 
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them. It is not our purpose in this article to propose detailed rules regarding any practical 
question that would be raised if such an instruments were considered for practical 
implementation. Neither is it to establish a systematic comparison of tradable permits with 
other economic instruments, such as incentive taxation, or with Command and Control (CAC) 
approaches7, or to elaborate an integrated framework using allowance trading for all types of 
atmospheric pollutants (NOx, PM, ..). We intend to simply give a sense of why it might be a 
good idea to develop SO2 trading schemes for organising the EU action against acid deposits, 
and what could be the broad design of such trading schemes. Accordingly it provides some 
insights on how to shape an economic instrument so as to make it compatible with basic 
institutional features of existing regulatory regimes. 
Such proposals are conceived for an implementation limited to the power generation 
sector, although an extension to all large combustion plants, including SO2 emissions of 
refineries, would be profitable so as to enlarge the market and set a more comprehensive 
action framework. 
This paper contains two main parts. The first develops the issues of the European acid 
policy, and sets out the general background of the related regulatory regime. It also gives an 
overview of the theoretical and actual features of emissions trading mechanisms. It then 
considers the potential attractiveness of SO2 trading in the EU. This background throws light 
on the more specific analyses and proposals described in the second part of the paper, which is 
devoted to a presentation of possible frameworks for SO2 trading in the power generation 
sector in the EU. In section 2.1., we look at some key design variables. In section 2.2., we 
present three alternative ways of designing a trading scheme. In section 2.3., we consider 
specific issues related to zoning and scaling. 
 
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Issues in European acid policy 
Airborne acid deposition has been considered a major environmental problem in Europe for a 
significant period of time. A key achievement of the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972 was to focus the attention of European 
governments on this issue. Since then, successive policy responses have been given. 
Major recent steps have been: the LRTAP 1985 Protocol of Helsinki on SO2, which 
led to the so-called 30% Club, i.e. countries committing themselves to achieving at least a 
                                                 
7.- This has been achieved in the context of OECD (see for example 1993, 1994) or, more recently, the IPCC 
process (Working Group III's 1995 report). 
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30% cut in SO2 emissions by 1993 relative to 1980 levels; the EU 1988 Large Combustion 
Plants Directive (LCPD) (88/609/EEC) introducing SO2 and NOx emission standards for new 
plants (after July 1, 1987) and global country caps on emissions from existing sources, with 
three stages (1993, 1998 and 2003); and the LRTAP 1994 Protocol of Oslo defining new and 
differentiated targets for emission abatement on a per country basis. For the first time at this 
level, major progress has been planned for emissions from both new and existing plants, with 
most European countries8 required to make overall reductions in emissions of 40%-80% 
relative to 1980 levels, with a mean value of 62% for the EU. Table 1 gives targets for a 
selection of countries. 
 
Table 1 : national emission targets for SO2 set by the Oslo Protocol 
Countries Actual emissions 
kt SO2 per year 
Sulphur emission caps Abatement percentage 
(reference year 1980) 
 
1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Austria 397 90 78 - - 80 - - 
Belgium 828 443 248 232 215 70 72 74 
Denmark 451 180 90 - - 80 - - 
France 3348 1202 868 770 737 74 77 78 
Germany 7494 5803 1300 990 - 83 87 - 
Greece 400 510 595 580 570 0 3 4 
Italy 3800 - 1330 1042 - 65 73 - 
Netherlands 466 207 106 - - 77 - - 
Spain 3319 2316 2143 - - 35 - - 
Sweden 507 130 100 - - 80 - - 
United Kingdom 4898 3780 2449 1470 980 50 70 80 
 
The Oslo Protocol reveals tension between the nature of the commitments taken by 
governments and the type of thinking developed during the preparatory work. The 
commitments are formulated in terms of national ceilings, although preliminary work was 
focused on catching decentralised connections between localised sources and localised 
deposits, according to a grid of 150 km X 150 km cells, irrespective of national boundaries. 
This was achieved with the help of the EMEP model. Consequently, experts were working to 
obtain the maximum practical acknowledgement that emissions generate different impacts, 
                                                 
8.- Within the EU, exceptions are Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
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depending on their location.9 Moreover, the EMEP assessment of pollutant transport shows 
that one receptor zone can often receive deposits from various sources located in different 
places. There is at present a risk that a country will satisfy its national target by decreasing 
emissions from plants which are not the most damaging. A concentration of the abatement 
effort on a few plants located in the same region may also occur. The result would be an 
unequal impact on various receptors - some will see their situation improved, while others 
may see little change from the present level of deposits. So, the protocol does not include 
regulatory measures that could guarantee the achievement of its long term objective. This is a 
new challenge, whatever policy instrument is used. For example, to secure this objective with 
emissions standards, they would have to become absolutely stringent for every existing 
source. This could be dramatically costly. 
An alternative to CAC would be the introduction of national markets for SO2 
emissions allowances in the power generation sector according to the bubble concept, i.e. 
national zones within which exchanges of emission allowances are accepted without 
constraint. This would not change anything in the legal situation established by the Oslo 
Protocol, regarding the obligations that have to be fulfilled relating to physical environmental 
performance. To the extent that national ceilings have been accepted by the Protocol, there is 
no reason why the location of the abatement efforts within countries should create a legal 
problem, provided that other rules included in the Protocol are met. This bubble approach may 
improve the cost-effectiveness of the measures that have been decided centrally. Generally 
though the bubble concept is applied to situations where the regulator wants to develop cost-
effective means to reduce emissions without worrying about the location of emissions. This is 
not really the case as regards acid deposits in Europe. By itself, setting-up national bubbles in 
the electricity sector could not guarantee the achievement of a cost-effective abatement plan 
meeting the goal of a 60% -and further- reduction of the gap between current deposition and 
the 5-percentile critical load. So, at best, national schemes of trading emissions allowances 
would be partial mechanisms. This realisation should not lead to such schemes being 
dismissed out of hand. Rather, it may mean that something else is required to supplement the 
instrument. 
One article of the Oslo Protocol is of interest in this respect. Article 2, paragraph 8 
acknowledges the future potential of joint implementation. It says: "the Parties to this 
Protocol may, at a session of the Executive Body, in accordance with rules and conditions 
which the Executive Body shall elaborate and adopt, decide whether two or more Parties may 
jointly implement the obligations set out in annex II." This scope for joint implementation 
seems to open the door to the possibility of some international exchange of targets. So, under 
                                                 
9.- It may matter a great deal whether they are located in the North or in the South of a given country, particularly 
if it is a large country, such as Germany. 
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conditions that still have to be specified10, the EU countries could envisage a pooling of 
efforts by adopting a single emissions quota for the EU. 
This idea of an EU joint implementation faces two types of obstacle: 
• Firstly, there is a risk that a strictly regulated joint implementation scheme will raise 
obstacles to the flexibility already existing at the national level. For instance, a conflict may 
emerge between the development of national trading schemes as a way to implement 
national ceilings, and an EU joint implementation, since new constraints related to critical 
loads then have to be incorporated into the rules. Another conflict may arise between the 
rules and requirements imposed to joint implementation and the flexibility needed for the 
development of EU-wide trading schemes. In both respects, too cautious an approach to 
joint implementation may create additional constraints which make the exercise unfeasible 
or cause it to lose its economic attractiveness. 
• Secondly, a full development of joint implementation may call into question the rationale 
of the political negotiation which resulted in the distribution of national targets set in the 
Protocol. The national ceilings represent political commitments which often involve 
difficult considerations and tricky compromises. If proposed regulations for joint 
implementation introduce new allocation rules (for instance a merging of all national 
targets of EU countries into one overall EU target, redistributed among countries according 
to some new rule) they can meet severe political opposition or require an entirely new 
negotiation. 
A way between these two types of obstacles has to be found. Up to now, the proposals 
formulated by the Working Group established in the context of the LRTAP envisage mainly 
bilateral agreements between decentralised sources. They also focus on the protection of the 
interests of third parties and the proof required to show that a specific joint action will achieve 
progress towards reducing the critical loads gap. The acceptance of a joint implementation 
agreement between two or more parties would require the consensus of all parties. Such 
proposals are very far from the concept of an emissions or deposit allowances market and are 
more in the spirit and form of political agreements. 
Meanwhile, an original feature of the Oslo Protocol was the great attention paid to the 
cost and economic efficiency dimension of the new measures. A specific committee (Working 
Group on Strategies) was in charge of this dimension. This group's objective was to sketch 
emission abatement scenarios which could simultaneously take into account the benchmark of 
                                                 
10.- A Working Group has been set up, within the Executive body of the Convention, to develop these rules for 
joint implementation. It proposes that "a joint implementation agreement shall lead to a decrease in the 
difference between depositions of sulphur resulting from the emission ceilings listed in annex II and the critical 
sulphur depositions within the geographical scope of EMEP" (UNECE, 1995). 
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critical loads and minimise the total economic cost of abatement. This resulted in a set of  
targets differentiated by country. 
This new concern for the economic costs of acid rain policy is quite understandable. 
The more stringent regulations are, the greater the risk that they will impose unduly high 
costs, since it is generally accepted that the marginal cost of abatement is increasing. For 
instance, simulations from the RAINS (Regional Acidification Information and Simulation) 
model have estimated that the regulatory approach in the 1988 LCPD, making use of emission 
and technological standards, increased costs by around 50% compared to the level of costs 
that would have been incurred using a flexible, incentive-based approach – for the same level 
of environmental performance. Uniformly tightening current regulations and standards could 
again prove excessively costly, at least as far as there still exist alternative courses of action 
available at the plant level, and abatement costs differ across the whole population of plants.11 
At the same time, emissions standards, by themselves, bring no guarantee about the respect of 
critical loads targets. 
Economic instruments, tradable permits particularly, can be credited with a significant 
potential for cost-saving in situations where a lot of economic and technological information 
required by centralised executive agencies is not at hand, and where is a presumption that 
marginal costs of abatement are quite different between countries and between plants. This 
seems to be the case with long range SO2 pollution, for which the importance of sources of 
uncertainty has been documented by economic studies (Maler, 1989 ; Newbery 1990). 
 
1.2. A short theoretical review of emission trading systems 
The first goal of environmental policy instruments is to achieve some environmental end. 
Economic aspects are not supposed to be the prime concern. Nevertheless, with the 
development of environmental policies, the weight of economic costs and benefits and the 
possible conflicts between economic development and environmental protection have become 
increasingly important. This is a logical consequence of the extension of environmental 
policies. Cost-effectiveness cannot be overlooked when a policy may lead to a significant or 
high level of economic costs. This is now the case for policy towards air pollution. 
 
                                                 
11.- If objectives are set at a level so stringent that they can only be reached with all existing plants using the 
same specific means (one sort of scrubber, for instance), there is no place for cost-savings to be obtained by more 
flexible incentive-based approaches intended to achieve the same level of environmental performance. 
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1.2.1. Two major features: securing a global environmental performance and minimising 
total abatement costs 
A regulatory and an economic approach to pollution control do have the same ultimate 
purpose - a reduction in environmental damage. However, they do not cope with this issue in 
the same way. Where standards and limits are set, they are usually uniform within a few broad 
classes of plants, with the classes varying according to the scale of capacity and whether the 
plants are new or already existing. The US experience shows that when the regulatory system 
is based on environmental quality standards, a rigid CAC approach could lead to such extreme 
requirements as a ban on any new economic development in "non-attainment" zones 
incapable, on a long term basis, of satisfying these standards: growth of economic activity 
continuously offsets individual efforts to cut emissions. Avoiding the need to block economic 
development for environmental reasons was one of the main reasons for introducing tradable 
permits in the USA in the seventies (Hahn and Hester, 1989), first for tackling local pollution 
issues (Dwyer, 1992) and secondly for addressing the acid rain problem countrywide (Rico, 
1995). 
A brief comparison with an approach based on emission standards (Emission 
Standards Approach) may be useful for eliciting arguments in favour of tradable permits. The 
first point concerns the securing of a global cap on emissions of pollutants. Within an ESA, 
constraining sources to reduce their emissions to the maximum level economically possible is 
seen as the most direct means of decreasing the total amount of pollution flows. With this 
approach, it is difficult to assess ex ante the total amount of emissions which might result 
from the regulations. This will depend on the level of activity of sources and the dynamics of 
development for the population of sources involved (i.e. closure of some facilities, creation of 
new sources). Though existing and new sources do not generally face the same level of 
constraints, construction of a new facility satisfying environmental regulations will add to the 
global level of emissions, since there is no automatic offsetting change in the behaviour of 
existing facilities. 
With an emission trading system, the most interesting approach12 is to establish a 
global cap over the total amount of emissions. This cap provides global control over and 
across existing and new sources. As they are derived from this global cap, it follows that 
individual allowances will be compatible with the overall emissions targets.13 In this respect 
                                                 
12 .- An alternative is the crediting approach: individual facilities having received individual caps are given 
credits for additional reductions they achieve in excess of the legal requirements. This piecemeal approach does 
not allow an easy management of a global constraint. 
13.- Illegal practices and emissions may occur. But this possibility may be even greater with a CAC approach. 
With tradable permits, there is a general incentive for all owners of permits to preserve the value of their permits 
and to avoid illegal free-riding by others. Their vigilance may be useful as regards the seriousness of control of 
entitlements. CAC does not provide such an incentive. 
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tradable permits provide a level of environmental security which is quite superior to that 
reached by a traditional ESA approach. 
More generally, the two approaches do not imply the same obligations and 
opportunities or the same individual and social costs. Tradable permits generate more cost-
effectiveness since they allow to catch the potential of cost-minimisation created by individual 
differences. Let us illustrate these differences with the following situation. Suppose we have 
two sources, S1 and S2 which have different marginal cost functions MC1 and MC2. Regulator 
decides to decrease emissions by a fixed percentage relative to some reference year. For 
instance, the regulator can set a target of a 50% reduction in emission levels. This is illustrated 
in Figure 1. S10 is the quantity of emissions from source 1 at time 0; S11 is the quantity of 
emissions S1 has to reach at time 1; and so on for S2 ... The direct costs for achieving these 
50% reductions are as follows: 
 • S1: C + D + E 
 • S2: B 
 • Total social costs: B + C + D + E 
If the sources are allowed to trade on the basis of their allocated quotas of emissions, 
they get another equilibrium. The sources will exchange permits as long as their marginal 














Figure 1: a 50% abatement 
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Finally, after trading, including transfers payments, the total abatement costs are allocated as 
follows: 
 • S1: (D) + C 
 • S2: (A + B) - C 
 • Total social costs: A + B + D, with A << C + E 
 
1.2.2. Additional advantages of tradable permits 
Additional advantages attributed to tradable permits by the economic literature are the 
following: 
• Limiting the information needed by administrative authorities to adequately manage the 
regulatory regime. The authorities do not have to know the abatement cost functions of 
individual sources. If the initial allocation of permits does not match the real cost structure 
of individual sources, trading among sources will correct the situation up to a point where 
marginal costs will more or less be equalised. 
• Providing a permanent incentive to reduce pollution beyond what is required by 
administrative authorities. This is because additional abatement efforts can be made 
profitable: for instance, the allowances saved can be banked for a future use, when this 
opportunity is permitted, or sold for money to other firms. 
• Introducing flexibility into the response functions. Tradable allowances let decentralised 
agents invent new types of responses or new combinations of responses. In this respect, this 
instrument stimulates technological and organisational innovation and will contribute to an 
improvement in the conditions under which firms have to address the pollution problem in 
the future. At the same time it avoids the unnecessary costs that could have been imposed 
by a technological forcing based on a wrong ex ante assessment of the costs and economic 
conditions involved, as it was shown by the beginnings (1992-1997) of the Acid Rain 
Program where the actual prices on the SO2 allowance market have reached much lower 
levels than generally expected by nearly an order of magnitude. Changes in the economic 
context (for instance, deregulation of tariffs for railway transportation) as well as incentives 
provided by the new regime (innovation in the scrubber business) have been responsible 
for lowering marginal costs of abatement (Ellerman et al., 1996; Burtraw, 1997). This 
demonstrates that allowance trading may be a source of efficiency not only by its own sake 
but also through avoiding costs that would have been imposed by other approaches. 
 
1.2.3. From emission permits to deposition permits 
The most spontaneous way to think of tradable permits in the field of pollution prevention are 
tradable emission permits. In most countries, emissions are already regulated through 
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administrative measures; monitoring systems have been developed, and so on. To make 
permits tradable is just one step further added on existing regulatory practices. Imposing a 
global cap on emissions for a given territory (yearly, monthly,...) sets a quantitative rationing 
that may give birth to a market, once economic agents (polluting firms) are allocated initial 
allowances. 
However, the framework of a trading permit system cannot be the same for pollutants 
which are uniformly absorbed by the environment and those which are not, and for pollutants 
which accumulate in ecosystems and those which do not. In this respect, SO2 is a non-
uniformly mixed, accumulative pollutant. This means that the location of the sources (and 
receptors, of course) of the pollutant does matter. If ambient concentration14 and deposits are 
too high in some places, though less than the mean value in other places, it generates net 
damage, with no physical compensation taking place. A trading permit system should 
therefore be established which takes into account the differential effect of pollutants on the 
ambient atmosphere and the receptors. Theoretically, this could lead alternatively to what is 
called an « ambient permit system » or a « deposition permit system ». In these cases, the 
permits are defined in terms of impacts of pollutant flows on ambient concentration or 
deposition flows for each zone. In both cases, there are as many markets as zones. 
For an « ambient permit scheme », the system originates in the setting-up of a 
maximum value for ambient concentrations of a given pollutant. Such concentrations are 
connected to emissions from various sources. Provided that appropriate data and modelling 
capabilities are available, each source is receiving an allocation of permits defined in terms of 
impact of emissions on ambient concentration for each relevant zone. To implement this 
procedure, it should be possible to assess the dispersion of the pollution flow from one source 
throughout the various zones of interest and to calculate equivalence rates between unit 
emissions from different sources according to their respective impact on atmospheric 
concentrations in each zone. One single emission flow will have to jointly meet n ambient 
concentration ceilings, defined by n different sorts of ambient permits related to n receptor 
zones Rn. If a source decides to trade some of its permits, its trading activity on the n markets 
will be interdependent, with the objective of minimising the constraint of the most binding Ri 
at the least cost and to maximise the value of permits it holds. All these transactions should be 
ideally organised in flexible, simultaneous markets. 
A deposition permit system looks the same as the ambient permit one, but it focuses on 
maximum achievable deposits in a zone. It requires the same high level of information and 
modelling capabilities about physical dispersion and transportation of pollutants from sources 
to receptors, in order to translate a given flow of emissions into several zone flows of 
deposition. 
                                                 
14.- LRTAP also refers to "critical levels" of ambient atmospheric concentrations of pollutants. 
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In practical terms, both ambient and deposition permit systems may be much 
demanding and entail organisational complications, depending on the number of zones they 
involve. They have not yet been experimented with at all. Meanwhile, intellectually, such 
schemes suit the regulation of the SO2 problem, to the extent that the Oslo Protocol poses a 
general reference to acid critical loads by unit zone. 
 
1.2.4. Some real-life features of allowance trading 
It is widely accepted that a tradable permit system can be cost-effective in a competitive 
environment, and so generate important savings in compliance costs. There is also a rather 
widespread view that some "real-life" features may reduce the amount of these potential 
benefits or add new relevant dimensions for the choice of a policy instrument. Some important 
features are now considered. 
 
The context of rules 
The institutional context is of great importance to how a market is run. The authorities have to 
define precisely what constitutes a tradable allowance. Potential participants have to know 
exactly what their rights and obligations are and what the legal background (as regards fiscal 
aspects, or civil and penal responsibility, for instance) is. A stringent programme of emissions 
monitoring is needed to ascertain the tradable allowances. A register has to be set up to keep 
track of each transaction so as to update the asset count of each decentralised agent. Previous 
experience has shown how important the attitude of the authorities is regarding the 
development of allowance trading, the restrictions maintained, the extent of regulatory control 
of each trade (preliminary authorisation,...), the change of the rules, and so on. For instance, if 
administrative services express a basic suspicion of trading, through an accumulation of 
regulatory constraints or a fiscal penalty on benefits, the market will be thin or non-existent. 
This is not a defect of tradable permits as such, but of the way their introduction is managed. 
The general evolution of economic institutions may also have a positive or negative 
influence on the development of trading, by changing the perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
instrument. If the EU practice of applying quotas in other economic sectors (fisheries, 
agriculture, air traffic, and so on) had been based for some time on a regime of tradable quotas 
or licences, the legitimacy of trading emissions allowances would not be seen to be as much 
of an obstacle. 
 
The issue of initial allocation of allowances 
13 
To launch an allowance trading system, it is necessary to design a rule for making an initial 
allocation of allowances among sources. Politically, this is not an easy task, since political 
realism and principles of justice and fairness may be in conflict. Different rules for allocating 
permits can be envisaged (auctions, free distribution according to various criteria such as 
"grandfathering", level of technological capabilities, gross product, the potential for emissions 
abatement, and so on). 
In practical terms, grandfathering is the most frequent criterion of allocation that has 
been used in the USA, most recently within the framework of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (CAAA). With this rule, the initial allocation of permits is based on past 
emissions at a conventional reference year or period, to achieve a prorata allocation of the 
total cap. So, the more a firm has been polluting in the past, the more it will receive permits. 
Three sorts of justification are generally given for this criterion: a) since pollution is a 
consequence of some industrial activity, it is fair that each firm receives an allocation 
reflecting the technological conditions of its own activity; b) since past pollution was accepted 
by the authorities, some common law right of usage would have to be acknowledged; c) this is 
the allocation generating the least perturbation in business activities. Nevertheless firms which 
have not yet installed desulphuring equipment will greatly benefit, compared to those who 
have installed such equipment in the past. Giving such an advantage to big polluters is often 
said to be unfair, and immoral, though it may be a convenient way to avoid strong opposition 
from them. 
In a context of perfect competition and information, the general view is that the initial 
allocation would have no implications for economic efficiency, even if the distributive 
implications are important. Whatever allocation rule is used, the market mechanism will re-
allocate the emission allowances in a cost-effective manner. But in practice, transactions costs 
do restrict the fluidity of the market and so distributive and efficiency considerations do get 
mixed together (Stavins, 1995). Consequently, the goal of economic efficiency would be 
advantageously considered at the stage of the initial allocation of allowances. 
As regards equity, two dimensions relating to the financial burden are generally 
discussed (Tietenberg, 1985): 
• Vertical equity refers to a judgement on how to treat people having unequal levels of 
income or economic capability. 
• Horizontal equity refers to the conditions of equal treatment given to equals. 
Another distinction is between a judgement on the quality of the procedure (fair 
procedures, procedural justice) and a judgement on the justice of the end-results of a process.  
Finding a rule for making an initial allocation which can guarantee a satisfactory 
treatment of all these various dimensions and concepts looks quite impossible. Due to the 
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unpredictability of the final allocation of allowances which results from the combination of 
the initial allocation and the flow of trades, it is generally impossible to implement an "end-
result" criterion for equity. Therefore attention is usually focused on the procedure. If the 
initial allocation is considered to be fair, letting people trade cannot produce a result which is 
unfair, provided that no Third Party is affected by a transaction. 
One advantage of auctions is that they could deliver, at the very beginning of the 
process, a reference price on which participants can base their calculations and elaborate their 
strategies. However, this method places a higher financial burden, in relative terms, on the 
poorest participants15 and on the biggest polluters. Both consequences entail a significant 
political disadvantage. Since the goal of public environmental policy is generally not to push 
industrial firms out of business, but to implement technological means ensuring that industrial 
activity becomes more compatible with environmental quality, without impairing economic 
competitiveness, this auction approach does not seem to have so much appeal to governments 
that are interested in preserving their industrial basis. Some mixed allocation rule may be 
envisaged such as 70 % allocated according to the grandfathering rule and 30% auctioned. 
 
Transaction costs 
The higher the transaction costs, the lower cost-effectiveness of an emission trading system 
will be. A key feature of transaction costs is access to information, in particular identifying 
potential trade partners. Searching procedures have proven to be costly to participants when 
the market is thin. Another feature is the regulatory constraints imposed by the authorities 
(various restrictions, administrative files, delays, unpredictability of administrative decisions). 
A third aspect is related to the scale of the market. As emissions allowances are not ordinary 
commodities, the level of emissions depends more on investment choices about the 
technology than day-to-day management. Consequently, in some cases, the volume of 
transactions may not be sufficient to sustain a regular market. Accordingly transactions are 
going to be episodic and bilateral, and they will have a strategic dimension. Bilateral 
transactions sequences will almost certainly not lead to an optimum outcome. The United 
States experience in the seventies showed that transaction costs could be as high as 10 to 30% 
of the total value of transactions. Brokers could reduce transaction costs by capturing and 
centralising information and facilitating meetings between potential partners, but their fees 
will cover part of the savings made. 
It is worth noting that the Acid Rain Program was explicitly designed so as to limit 
transactions costs for both the administration and utilities, and reduce the administrative 
                                                 
15.- In relative terms, they have to spend a higher part of their resources than others to buy allowances. 
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burden on the instrument. So much lower transaction costs are now expected, though 
transactions have not been so numerous until 1995. 
 
Effects on technological change and progress 
In competitive conditions, using an economic instrument will generate an incentive to 
incorporate technological progress. The opportunity to trade the allowances saved is a 
permanent incentive to look for means of achieving additional reduction of emissions beyond 
the allocated quotas. The technological flexibility also avoids drawbacks of technological 
forcing and opens the door to a search of the cheapest means of satisfying environmental 
requirements. 
Most importantly, technology should not be thought of as something fixed, with the 
regulatory mechanism enforcing its use in some optimal way. In the medium and long term, 
technology should be seen as an induced-variable,16 which depends on the choice of the policy 
instrument. Some instruments may stimulate technological innovation, just as others impede 
innovation. Enforcing a rigid technological standard can curb down the dynamics of 
innovation. An evolutionary standard, corresponding to the concept of the best available 
technology, may not be sufficient to counterbalance such a negative effect. More often than 
not, performance standards are set implicitly with reference to a specific technology. 
There is another critical aspect to technological progress. Investing in a scrubber is an 
irreversible decision, involving sunk costs. After such an investment, a company will not be 
ready to take other abatement actions for a long time. Since an investment fixes a technology 
(performance and cost), a premature regulatory enforcement of this type of investment obliges 
firms to forego the possible benefits from innovations yet to come on stream. With a trading 
permit approach, firms can calculate the best time to invest in abatement, taking into account 
the possible development of cost-saving innovations. 
 
Summary conditions of successful tradable permits 
On the whole, tradable allowance systems need a conjunction of several features if they are to 
run in a way which allows all potential efficiency gains to be exploited. Hahn and Noll (1990) 
elicit some desirable features of trading schemes regarding micro-economic efficiency: 
• the overall number of emissions allowances needs to be well defined and limited; 
• allowances should be as freely tradable as possible, without restrictions; 
• it should be possible to capitalise allowances; 
                                                 
16.- It can be referred to the general category of endogenous technological progress, though this category is 
mixing several different things. 
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• trading of permits should be made inexpensive (lowering transaction costs); 
• sanctions for cases of emissions exceeding allowances should be set at a sufficiently 
high level so that firms have a strong incentive to keep playing within the rules of 
the allowance system; 
• emission allowances should be expropriated only in extreme circumstances; 
• firms should be allowed to retain a significant share of the profits obtained through 
each trade. 
 
Choosing the less damaging uncertainty in the long run 
The pervasive lack of appropriate information is critical in implementing environmental 
policies. After all, if all the existing information could be easily gathered, it would be possible 
to centrally define a detailed plan of optimal abatement efforts, which could be implemented 
by administrative regulatory measures. Then there would be no case for introducing economic 
instruments. In real-world conditions, administrative standards may be poorly implemented 
and entailed important hidden costs. Economic instruments cannot avoid this uncertainty issue 
either. It means that choosing a type of instrument comes down, to a large extent, to choosing 
which variables are going to be left uncertain. No instrument can provide certainty for all 
variables. 
With tradable permits, a global emissions cap may be enforced and guaranteed to some 
extent, but the counterpart is uncertainty about the market price of allowances and uncertainty 
about the exact location of emissions, and therefore localised damage. With taxes and charges, 
the rate of which is defined by public authorities, certainty is obtained on the maximum unit 
abatement cost to be paid by polluters. The counterpart to this is a range of uncertainty on the 
environmental performance obtained during a given period, since price elasticities are not 
generally known with great precision. 
Which uncertainty is the least desirable is a matter for debate, since a short term view 
and a long run view will not necessarily come to the same conclusion. Less certainty about 
short run environmental performance may be linked, through lower abatement costs, to better 
long term environmental performance. Conversely, obsession with short run environmental 
certainty may induce higher economic abatement cost and contribute to a limited 
improvement of environmental quality in the longer term (Godard, 1993). 
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1.3. Sources of the attractiveness of SO2 trading in the EU 
To define centrally a credible international plan for a cost-effective abatement of emissions 
would require relevant information in a number of different fields: 
• the listing of emission sources and their precise location; 
• techniques in use, and the exact quantity of emissions at any time; 
• potential techniques and action-mix for decreasing emissions for each source; 
• the costs of alternative technologies, and the competitive effect of their 
implementation; 
• the marginal costs of reducing pollution for each source; 
• trajectories of transport of pollutants from the source to the location of deposits; 
• potential chemical reactions in the air and on the ground, and their ecological 
impact; 
• effects upon ambient concentrations and ground deposition; 
and so on. 
The state of information is generally rather far from perfect information on all these 
points. If central modelling and planning may be useful to arrive at some international 
agreement on targets, information gaps and asymmetries plea for the supplementary 
introduction of an economic mechanism to implement the agreement in a cost-effective way. 
Let us check some of the listed points in the context of the LRTAP Convention. 
 
Technical-economic data 
As regards the identification of emissions sources, existing directories listing the power plants 
in the ex-EEC (UDI, 1993) does not give information about the location of plants within each 
country and does not include data on desulphuring equipment being installed or not installed. 
No systematic, detailed information is provided about SO2 emissions by plant. As regards 
information on technical options for abating SO2 emissions, the literature focuses on 
techniques corresponding to the concept of Best Available. Since BATNEEC was enforceable 
for new plants only, a lot of existing plants have not used them.  
Existing assessments of desulphuring costs (average and marginal) do not provide 
costs plant by plant, but a broad evaluation of the possible range of variation of costs. 
Unsurprisingly, costs depend a lot on the techniques used. At the same time, and more 
surprisingly, it has been discovered that plants often do not choose the least expensive 
techniques first. This is because several very different factors influence the choice of a 
technological response, such as plant size, position in the life-cycle and previous technological 
choices. 
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For instance, among the possible actions in response to an increase in the emissions 
constraint is fuel substitution according to the sulphur content of fuels. The respective prices 
of various categories of fuel depend on the international market. Variations in prices, and gaps 
between them, are therefore a key feature. But the price gap between high and low sulphur 
fuels has shown to be very volatile. 
So, the cost estimates that have been used in the modelling exercises developed in the 
context of the LRTAP convention, have to be seen as fragile and approximate. They may keep 
their usefulness in macro-assessments, not as a description of the real costs borne by 
individual plants due to SO2 emissions constraints. There is a need for an economic 
mechanism to reveal what the real costs are. 
 
Environmental data 
UNECE is implementing a pollutant transport model that was developed in the context of the 
LRTAP Convention. This is the EMEP program. This model has achieved a lot and is 
appropriate for giving a broad assessment of long-range transboundary pollution, but it has 
more limited predictive qualities for local effects, since the level and timing of localised 
emissions are not known precisely. The concept of critical loads of rather small European 
territorial units (150km X 150 km) should also be taken with some distance since it has been 
shown that the internal dispersion of acid carrying capacity may be often greater than the 
dispersion across units. 
 
The Oslo Protocol 
• In the Oslo Protocol, the searched "optimum" is understood as that allocation which 
minimises total costs of all parties, while being compatible with the constraint of abating 60 % 
of the gap between deposits and the 5-percentile critical loads for each cell of the territorial 
grid where critical loads are exceeded. To declare national targets to be at the "optimum" 
would require that the negotiated targets correspond strictly to the results of an economic 
modelling exercise, and that this modelling exercise has been fed by perfect ecological 
(emission and transportation of pollutants from each source, deposits and critical loads) and 
economic (abatement costs function for each source) information. 
Several integrated models have been used to assess the impacts of a plan on abatement 
costs and environmental deposition. In spite of similarities of construction, unresolved 
differences remain between the results of models (UNECE, 1993, R 38). The extent of 
variation in the results for different plans supposed to meet the same framework of 
optimisation under the same constraints is a good way to appreciate the overall range of 
uncertainty as regards the various components of the long range transboundary transport of 
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pollutants. Although results are stable or quasi-stable for some countries, they are significantly 
different for others. Differences vary from 10 to 50% of the emissions abatement required 
from a country. Overall reduction costs also vary by a factor of two. In some extreme cases, 
recommendations may be even reversed: for example, in the case of Albania, for which one 
model advises a 4% reduction, others would allow a 30% increase. 
On the whole, several sources of gaps and imperfections point to the need to use an 
economic mechanism for implementing the LRTAP Convention: 
• The targets which have been adopted in the Protocol are different from the supposedly 
optimal targets which resulted from modelling exercises; 
• In spite of the progress achieved in data collection and modelling, the authorities cannot be 
credited with accurate information regarding the transport of pollutants and their impacts; 
for instance, the RAINS model is based on aggregate national data of emissions, not on 
monitoring of individual sources; 
• The way the abatement cost curves have been built makes them rather arbitrary top-down 
translation of mean values based on assessments by classes of techniques. This does not 
reflect the true differences and variety of specific cost functions of individual sources. 
Lack of appropriate information is supporting the introduction of a trading scheme, 
provided that such a scheme is not placed under the pressure of having to prove ex ante its 
performance with the kind of detailed justification that would only be possible with nearly 
perfect information. Clearly, there would be a paradox in requiring that an envisaged 
economic instrument has to demonstrate ex ante the benefits and impacts from its introduction 
through exact calculations, since it is only economically efficient to introduce such an 
instrument because of imperfections in the information available to centralised authorities. 
The available information collected and used in the modelling exercises has permitted 
important progress in the tracing of the possible differential effects of SO2 emissions 
according to the location of sources. This progress has allowed a new approach to the 
negotiation of national targets for future abatement within the Oslo Protocol. But the 
information that could allow an optimal plan for emissions abatement to be defined centrally 
is not available. Therefore there is a need to supplement the present state of the regulatory 
system with an economic instrument which can help reveal costs, encourage further progress 
in cutting the cost of abatement technologies, and improve the cost effectiveness of the 
negotiated allocation of targets. One difficulty on the way of this economic instrument may be 
raised by the level of stringency of the obligation to forecast the impact of trading on the 
location of deposits, so as to prove that the objective of a 60% reduction in the gap between 
deposits and the 5-percentile critical loads is being respected. Some trade-off between 
economic efficiency and short term environmental assurance is inescapable. 
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2. TRADING SO2 EMISSION ALLOWANCESBETWEEN THERMAL 
POWER PLANTS IN THE EU: POSSIBLE FRAMEWORKS 
 
To design a tradable permits system in the context of the Oslo Protocol for SO2 involves a 
choice of several key variables. The goal of this article is to consider some possible 
combinations of these variables, those able to catch a significant part of the potential for 
economic efficiency while being manageable. Administrative and practical workability is a 
key condition for acceptability and success of policy innovation. 
We consider first the choices at the level of variables taken independently. On this 
basis we describe three alternatives proposals for designing a SO2 trading scheme in the EU. 
Eventually we address the specific topic of zoning, which is a critical issue for our proposals. 
 
2.1. Key variables for the design of a trading scheme 
Six variables have been selected as key variables to be reviewed: basic constraints of the 
regime; who are the basic agents taking part to the system; the initial allocation of allowances; 
the administrative mechanisms of delivering permits to trade allowances; the exchange rate; 
timing and periodicity of trades. At the end of the presentation, a synthesis table will gather 
the main options together in one frame. 
 
2.1.1. Basic constraints of the game 
For any trading scheme,  fundamental constraints originate in the specific goal of the regime, 
and the specific institutional framework in which the new regime is introduced. The Geneva 
Convention, with its Oslo Protocol, sets the appropriate background. It addresses long range 
transboundary transport of acid pollutants. This physical interregional dimension explains why 
European institutions are concerned. According to the subsidiarity principle, the EU is not 
directly responsible for the management of local pollution. So all issues of local quality of 
ambient air for direct health17 purposes are outside the responsibility of LRTAP Convention 
and outside the scope of the trading regime that is being drawn up in this article. As already 
said, we interpret the Oslo Protocol requirements as involving a double constraint to satisfy 
for the design of a trading scheme: 
*  overall national targets related to emissions; 
                                                 
17.- This Convention does refer to the protection of health as one of its objectives, but only inasmuch as health 
issues can be generated by long run transportation of pollutants. It is not covering action against intense local 
pollution. 
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*  the 60% abatement target18 as regards deposition in zones in excess of critical loads; for 
zones in which critical loads are not presently exceeded, respecting critical loads in the 
future as well will be the constraint. 
There is no reason why both constraints should automatically coincide; how to meet both of 
them poses a difficult challenge for the design of a trading system. A key feature of this article 
is to address this specific issue of satisfying two types of constraints when developing an 
allowance trading scheme. The joint implementation of the first constraint by the EU countries 
provides a global EU cap on emissions, leading to allowances that can be directly expressed in 
quantities of emissions. The second constraint introduces much more complexity into the 
system and leads directly to allowances expressed in terms of quantities of deposits by unit 
zones for the whole European territory. 
 
2.1.2. Basic agents 
Governments or firms? 
A trading scheme authorises exchanges of allowances among entitled agents. Who should be 
the players of the European SO2 game? Two basic types of agents are difficult to avoid: 
governments and firms that operate plants. This arises because both types of agent are 
necessarily involved. Governments are parties to the Oslo Protocol and have accepted national 
ceilings that they may want to modify in the future through trading. This would lead to joint 
implementation between states. At the same time, the agents having emissions directly under 
their control are power utilities and other firms operating large combustion plants. Three 
solutions may be considered, provided that they are designed to be compatible with the second 
constraint concerning critical loads: 
• a governmental "joint implementation" trading system: governments may develop joint 
implementation agreements in order to modify their Oslo obligations; 
• an EU plant trading system: utilities of EU countries could directly exchange the 
allowances received from national authorities. In this case, governments would be rather 
passive actors, once the phase of initial allocation of allowances to plants was achieved; 
• a two-level (governmental and plant) European trading scheme: both systems coexist and 
have to be co-ordinated in a precise, predictable way, presumably through a differentiation 
of time scales in the two markets. 
In the context of this paper, we have chosen to draw up a framework for trading 
schemes involving plants as the main focus. This choice is consistent with the concern for 
economic efficiency. From the viewpoint of economics of information, the potential for cost-
                                                 
18.- Later on, more stringent objectives as regards critical loads (say 75% and 90% abatement rate of the 
exceedance of deposits) may be adopted. 
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effectiveness can only be exploited by giving appropriate incentives to decentralised 
management units i.e. to those who can most easily obtain the appropriate information 
concerning available opportunities, technologies and abatement costs. This is what allowance 
trading is intended to achieve. If governments were to be considered as the basic agents of the 
system, they would still miss some important information necessary to minimise the social 
cost of abatement. 
 
Why begin with the power generation sector? 
At the EU level, 88% of all SO2 emissions in 1990 were released by combustion facilities, and 
65% by power plants. It therefore seems quite natural to begin to implement trading schemes 
with this sector, on the basis of the bubble concept. This sector-based approach could be 
preferred to avoid unwanted interactions between sectors, which could make business more 
uncertain for all operators, since their own activity would be made dependent on actions and 
strategies from outsiders who do not belong to their usual business environment. Introducing a 
regime respecting sectoral boundaries, at least in an initial stage, expresses a precautionary 
attitude towards existing economic and industrial organisation. 
But what about introducing economic incentives into a sector of production that is  
largely oligopolistic, and even monopolistic in some countries? This specific industrial 
structure may be an obstacle to the development of trade. Oligopolistic and monopolistic 
companies do not face the same pressures to take advantage of any opportunity to make 
profits or minimise costs as competitive firms are supposed to do (Burtraw, 1994). They may 
prefer to make decisions supporting a good relationship with regulatory authorities and public 
opinion. 
Several arguments can be put forward that limit the weight of the previous objection. 
In a sense, if power generation is concentrated in a few companies, this may reduce 
transaction costs and facilitate a form of trading compatible with firms' strategic planning. An 
agreement between a limited number of producers is less costly to obtain, though the 
counterpart may be strategic biases. Companies are used to being in contact and negotiating 
between themselves, and to developing co-operative relations within professional 
organisations at national and international levels.19 Moreover, to some extent, the re-
organisation of the EU market for power, while introducing competition between producers to 
satisfy the demand of large consumers and to extend the possibilities of own-production with 
appropriate technologies (combined cycle gas plants, co-generation), may already be seen as 
an active incentive for improving competitiveness and increasing sensitivity to opportunities 
                                                 
19.- The most successful past experience of permit trading in the United States was the trading scheme of lead in 
gasoline (OECD, 1992b; Howe, 1994). Pre-existing routines of exchanges and negotiations between refineries 
were emphasised as an important component of this success (Godard, 1994). 
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for cutting costs.20 Finally, the response to the existence of national quasi-monopolies is to be 
found in the setting-up of a EU regime for SO2 trading, which enlarges competitive 
opportunities.  
In fact, several EU countries have already been convinced of the advantages of 
establishing a "bubble" mechanism in the electric sector. There already exists some experience 
in Europe on the basis of which trading schemes could be developed: 
• In 1984, Denmark enforced legislation setting a national bubble of 125,000 kton SO2 on 
the emissions from its power plants, to be met in 1995. 
• In 1990, the government of the Netherlands signed a covenant on the reduction of sulphur 
emissions with the 12 provinces, the association of 178 electricity producers (SEP) and the 
four individual companies for electricity generation. This agreement concerns a programme 
to reduce acid emissions up to the year 2000. It establishes ceilings on the total emissions 
of SO2 and NOx from the public power plants. (Klaassen, 1996). 
• In 1993, EDF, the main electric company in France (with 95% of production) signed a 
covenant with the government setting an obligation to limit total SO2 emissions to 220 kton 
per year by the year 2000. 
Other arguments may favour the choice of the power generation sector as the first one 
to experiment with SO2 allowance trading. Due to the existing regulatory regimes and the 
limited number of firms, this approach will avoid many new enforcement costs and leave 
administrations time to adapt and develop new rules and practices for other sectors (industrial 
combustion plants, oil refineries). The same sort of choice has been made in the USA. 
In the following discussion, we assume that a global cap has been defined on the 
amount of emissions of the power generation sector in each country. It is convenient to 
assume that the rate of abatement expected from this sector is the same as that at the national 
level. But a different cap would not alter the analysis. 
 
2.1.3. The initial allocation of allowances 
The Oslo Protocol can be seen as a compromise between an agreement among independent 
states and a more integrated approach that could be developed if all states chose to behave as 
the members of a single political community. Establishing emission ceilings on a country 
basis is a response to the first component of the compromise. The preliminary works of the 
Protocol were conceived with reference to the second component, with this idea of an 
integrated optimal plant for acid deposits for the whole European territory. 
                                                 
20.- There is some reminiscence here of the theory of "contestable markets" in industrial economics. A 
contestable market is when a monopoly firm is placed under the threat of a possible enter of new competitor in 
the sector and is incited by this threat not to behave as a monopolist firm. See Baumol (1982). 
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So, a first option is to imagine a EU-wide joint implementation, in which member 
states accept to transfer their national quotas to an EU Authority that would directly 
redistribute them to power plants according to some specific EU rules. Is it realistic? This 
might be in a fully developed European Federal Community, having reached a high level of 
political integration. It does not fit the present situation in the EU, nor with the context of the 
negotiations for the Oslo Protocol. So it seems preferable to think that even for an EU 
allowance trading scheme, the allocation of allowances should be first organised within the 
national contexts as a means of implementing the national targets fixed in the Oslo Protocol. 
Such national allowances should be acknowledged by every other country taking part in the 
trading scheme, so as to permit EU-wide allowance trading. The concern for critical loads will 
also lead to this initial allocation being supplemented by other procedures and constraints. 
This point should remind us that the initial allocation of allowances is always a critical 
moment for trading schemes, one open to suspicion, lobbying and negotiation. A CAC 
approach is seemingly less exposed to such a difficult process. When two plants of the same 
sector are submitted to the same objective constraint, no-one can complain about the 
implications for competition. However, with regulations there may be exemptions, exceptions 
and dispensations. The substance of the problem is therefore broadly the same for tradable 
permits as for CAC, but it is more transparent with trading schemes. In any case, the first 
source of possible distortions between countries is to be found in the Protocol itself or in the 
LCPD. Both texts include different targets fixed for each country. This may be seen as 
appropriate for environmental or political purposes, but at the same time is a potential source 
of distortion of competition between companies. 
What should be the method chosen to allocate allowances in each country? On the 
basis of past experience in the USA, the general concern of governments to enhance national 
industries, and the proximity to existing regulatory frameworks, it is reasonable to say that 
grandfathering is the most probable form of allocation mechanism. 
 
2.1.4. Administrative mechanisms of delivering permits to trade allowances 
According to several proposals, one way to avoid impairing the environmental objectives of 
the Oslo Protocol is to base the "trading mechanism" on the same assessment method and 
modelling tools that have been used for optimising the distribution of efforts among countries. 
This approach authorises to address the second, deposition constraint. It leads to a very 
particular form of trading, i.e. a family of centralised and semi-centralised trading mechanisms 
using central modelling. At first sight, the value of this proposal depends entirely on the 
quality of information gathered, aggregated and fed into the models, with a particular concern 





With this purely centralised system, a preliminary plan of potentially profitable trades is 
elaborated on the basis of physical and economic modelling. Achievement of these trades 
would increase the overall cost-effectiveness of the allocation, while meeting environmental 
constraints. Then trading is used to achieve what has not been yet possible in the context of 
the negotiation of the Protocol for political reasons - a strict application of the cost-effective 
allocation identified through modelling. The procedure could go this way: 
• Running the models could simultaneously provide a least-cost solution and, on the basis of 
the real allocation of targets in the Protocol, the optimal programme of exchanges between 
countries that would be required to establish this optimum. 
• A comparison of this optima plan and the actual national targets selected by the Protocol is 
made to prepare a correction programme that would then define a list of profitable 
allowance exchanges. A matrix synthesises the possibilities, with each vector representing 
a compatible transaction. 
• Each bilateral proposal is compared with the correction programme; any proposal outside 
of this matrix will be rejected. 
Ierland, Kruitwagen and Hendrix (1994) have called this mechanism "guided bilateral 
trade". "In guided bilateral trade, the decision by the central authority whether trade is 
allowed or not, is based on the cost effective emission abatement allocation. Only after all 
allowed bilateral trade transactions have taken place, the deposition targets will be met". An 
emission trading system would then be the linking mechanism between a technical solution, 
arrived at through modelling and optimising, and a political solution arrived at through 
negotiation. 
This centralised system could have several advantages. In particular, it could generate 
a high level of environmental and economic predictability and substantial gains in research 
costs, since potential partners have simply to look up in the correction programme who the 
right people to deal with are. A clear definition of the sequences of the process is also 
obtained. Firstly, there are national allocations under national ceilings constraints. Secondly, 
there is trading under a European critical loads constraint, according to a planned scheme of 
acceptable exchanges. 
Is optimality achievable this way in practice? Economists may recognise in the 
proposed system a variation of the pure Walrasian market model, which depends on the action 
of a central co-ordinator, the auctioneer. The auctioneer gathers data about potential quantities 
(supply and demand) and proposes prices, until an economic equilibrium is achieved, prior to 
any transaction taking place. This theoretical reference leads to an ambiguous judgement: if a 
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centralised, multilateral process is needed to reach a market optimum that could not be 
produced by bilateral transactions, then this trading system may not lead to the optimum since 
it is less than certain that all the necessary transactions will finally take place. A second 
reservation is linked to the quality of information centrally available, according to the views 
previously expressed. Because of the intrinsic limitations of information and the risk of partial 
implementation, a less-demanding use of models may be preferred. This is the case with semi-
centralised systems of trading. 
 
A semi-centralised system 
This semi-centralised system still uses modelling to guide transactions. However, the basic 
assumption of this approach is that the centralised economic information is not sufficient to 
identify the best opportunities for cutting abatement cost. So the economic part of the 
modelling exercises used in the previous centralised system is put aside, keeping only two 
models - the first about transports of pollutants (EMEP), and the other about critical loads and 
deposits - so as to identify current and prospective excesses of acid deposits. The economic 
dimension of the allocation will be left to decentralised calculations of sources (plants). 
Sources will have to compute their own strategy and look for interesting opportunities to 
trade. In this case, the process is as follows: 
• a EU Secretariat for SO2 trading enters the distribution of all the allowances resulting from 
the national implementation of national ceilings into the physical assessment models; 
• after a search period, two sources meet and agree on a trade proposal; they submit it to the 
Secretariat; 
• the projected change in location of emissions is entered in the agreed models which are run 
to provide forecasts about the environmental impacts for each deposit zone; 
• if the project violates the second condition related to the progress towards critical loads, it 
is not permitted; otherwise it is accepted. 
Presumably, there could be two disadvantages of buying this ex ante environmental 
quasi-certainty by means of this specific procedure. Administrative costs could be too high 
due to the procedures necessary for delivering a single permit to trade. This point should be 
elaborated further by simulations to assess orders of magnitude involved and to see whether 
the weight of the procedure makes trading a poorly attractive instrument in that context. 
Furthermore, because of the stochastic, bilateral nature of this system, it might not lead to an 
overall cost-effective allocation – one which would minimise the total abatement cost for a 
given environmental performance. This is because the sequential order of trades would matter. 
Whether a transaction is allowed or not may depend on whether or not it is proposed before 
some other transaction; most interesting trades may be blocked by early transactions 
exploiting the potential limited by the zone caps. Knowing which one is the most profitable is 
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not the driving force for early trades. However, if reaching a first best economic optimum is 
not the central concern of authorities, not because of disinterest but because it is 
acknowledged that this is not feasible, then sequential, bilateral trades can be seen as Pareto 
improvements, provided no third party is significantly affected. On the whole the initial 
allocation will be improved by this mechanism. 
 
A decentralised system 
Here the administrative requirements are quite limited. On the one hand, countries adopt a 
procedure for initially allocating allowances to individual sources. On the other hand, 
simulation models are used to translate the initial allocation of emissions allowances into 
deposits in receptor units. This simulation is used to define general trading rules that reflect 
the requirements of the critical loads constraint. They may incorporate zoning -with free 
trading within one same zone- or offset rates for trades between different zones. In that 
framework, allowances can be exchanged freely without a specific prior authorisation being 
imposed for each envisaged trade. All the requirements ensuring progress towards 
environmental targets are supposed to be fixed within the general rules. Some periodic 
adjustment of this allocation should be considered to take the evolution of pollution flows into 
account. 
Although theory would render centralised solutions attractive for their predictability 
and/or optimality features, implementing a decentralised system may be considered as more 
realistic with respect to the economics of information and administrative running simplicity, 
but it is much more uncertain as regards the environmental progress, to a degree that may be 
considered unacceptable in the LRTAP context. In the following, we only consider semi-
centralised systems to be a viable proposal. 
 
2.1.5. The exchange (offset) rate 
When the damage generated by one unit of a pollutant is independent of the location of the 
source, trading allowances may be organised on the basis of a ton for ton exchange rate. 
Because of the non-uniform assimilative property of SO2, in damage terms, "one unit from 
one source cannot be offset by one unit decrease from another source. The offset rate, also 
termed the exchange rate, may be greater or smaller than one" (Førsund and Nævdal, 1994). 
On a theoretical ground, offset rates should reflect the relative intensity of the marginal 
damage generated by one unit of emissions. It is difficult to find a rule able to reflect this 
requirement. Firstly, marginal damage functions are not known and some proxy has to be 
used. To be practical such a rule should keep its value through time, although conditions for 
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optimality require a revision of offset rates to be made after each trade.21 At the same time, 
this adaptive approach would make the game unpredictable for agents and complicate 
investments decisions.  
A proxy formula has been proposed by Bailey, Gough and Millock (1994) for defining 
satisfying exchange rates. These rates are based on transfer coefficients from sources to 
receptors, weighted by damage weights; here damage weights are just represented by the 
magnitude of the excess of deposits compared to the critical loads. An exchange rate between 
two sources will be calculated as a ratio between both transfer coefficients: 
 
 ∑k (T1,k. Gk) With Ti,k = transfer coefficient from i to k, 
Exchange rate1,2 = ___________ 




This formula is a useful statistical construct that certainly represents progress towards 
strict respect for the critical loads targets. Meanwhile, it should be realised that this type of 
aggregation of values has no immediate empirical correspondence. Specifically, it does not 
provide a guarantee that the critical load target will not be exceeded in any cell, since it is 
based on mean values. 
An alternative practical solution is to stick to a 1 to 1 rate within zones considered to 
be homogeneous. This simple and robust approach may be viewed as more accessible, and 
easy to implement, being less dependent on central modelling and revision of information. It 
is not totally satisfying either, since the supposed homogeneity of each zone can only be an 
artificial construct. 
 
2.1.6. Timing and periodicity of trades 
Nowadays, most ordinary commodity markets are quasi-permanent. Such exchanges do not 
depend on a body of permitting procedures or model simulations as it is the case for SO2 
allowances. In that case, with a rather thin potential for trade, it might be an idea to develop 
some periodic system of trading, such as old style fairs, in order to get a time concentration of 
demand and supply and overcome limits of separate bilateral trades. Moreover, in a two-level 
                                                 
21.- This is so because individual trades will not generally entail marginal impacts on the distribution of acid 
deposits: emissions are concentrated in a limited number of sources, while the territorial units are not so broad. 
and ∑k Ti,k = 1 
Gk = a damage weight index (from 1 to 8), i.e. a 
relative measure of how harmful deposition is to 
different classes of ecosystems, as a function of 
critical loads (taken from SEI work) 
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system of allowance trading, where there are trades between governments in respect to their 
national caps, and trades between plants once national caps have been decentralised to them, 
the intergovernmental market should be made highly predictable for plants, in order to ensure 
the security of the allowances they receive from public authorities, and to allow them rational 
investment strategies. A clear means of providing this predictability would be to organise a 
discrete, periodic intergovernmental market (every 4 years, for instance), with advance 
transactions, i.e. transactions having effect some years later (say 3 years). This would mean 
that basic plants can move in a predictable institutional environment, with a secure horizon in 
the range of 3 to 7 years. 
An alternative approach for a two-level system would be a flexible one in which 
governments regulate the total quotas given to plants on a continuous basis, as active 
operators on national markets. Governments could buy and sell allowances with national 
plants according to the evolution of their international commitments (intergovernmental 
market). However, this approach could also induce instability and unpredictability on the 
market, or raise the fear that governments will behave in an arbitrary manner influenced by 
lobbies. These factors may turn out to be an obstacle to technological innovation, when the 
weight and sunk costs of industrial investments in desulphuring equipment are taken into 
account. 
In the case of an EU-wide decentralised trading system between power plants, there 
should be no time constraint imposed if the type of trade considered is bilateral, once the 
initial national allocation of allowances has been achieved. By contrast, if some type of 
general equilibrium of the SO2 allowances market is preferred, the only practical means is to 
establish a periodic market where all potential sellers and buyers are invited to present their 
offers. If the idea of having as many markets as agreed homogeneous zones is accepted, offers 
in one zone market can only be contingent offers, since their value and relevance depend on 
the achievement of transactions on complementary zone markets. Ideally, all trades clearly 
have to be synchronised due to the mutual dependence of these markets. This periodic market 
will offer an opportunity to minimise transaction costs and reduce possible strategic biases. 
One intermediate solution between continuous, bilateral trading and periodic markets, 
is to combine both of them, along the way the USA have made it by establishing an auctioned 
SO2 allowances market which occurs once a year. Such a market provides both a public price 




2.1.7. A synthesis table 
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Figure 2: Key design variables 
 
The table in Figure 2 shows the main alternatives that have been considered. Basic 
variables are indicated on the line at the top of the table. Each column represents alternative 
possibilities for each variable. Pathways in bold suggest the choices that seem to us the most 
interesting and practical at the same time. These are the choices that support the three 
alternative proposals we present in the next section. 
 
2.2. Key alternative proposals 
Here, we present three alternative proposals that take in a comprehensive manner options 
identified as interesting and practical for key design variables. Two directions have been 
explored to design such proposals. The first one is based on the idea of coupling two types of 
allowances: emissions ones and deposit ones. The second one is searching an integrated 
system in which emissions and depositions constraints receive due count for determining the 
amount of SO2 allowances that can be traded. Two variants of the latter will be presented. 
With all three solutions, proposed trades are tested with models of pollutant transport for 
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ascertaining their impact on deposits for each unit zone. This modelling requirement could be 
judged excessive in launching what is supposed to be a "market" solution. But this input is 
generally required for the whole regime of the Oslo Protocol - without modelling it would not 
be possible to guide the progress of European abatement efforts towards the critical loads 
target. 
 
2.2.1. Implementing a system of two simultaneous, coupled allowance trading mechanisms 
Facing with the obligation to take into account two basic heterogeneous constraints (national 
targets and the goal of a 60% reduction in the gap between deposits and critical loads), a first 
possibility is to conceive of two different systems of trading, one for each constraint, which 
are coupled to permit sources to emit a given amount of SO2. To get the right to emit one ton 
of SO2, a source should possess one allowance of each type. The source would not be allowed 
to use an allowance of one type if it does not have a corresponding allowance of the other 
type. With such a system, each source would then operate on two types of markets for 
allowances - one for emissions allowances, working at the EU level and based on initial 
allocations distributed in national contexts, and one focused on the specific constraints for 
deposits in each receptor zone in Europe (including non EU regions). 
So, the system will take account of emissions from sources which belong to the 
territory of the EU, but generate acid deposits on European non EU lands. In the framework of 
the Oslo Protocol, the same basic constraints operate whatever the territory involved. 
Commitments to progress towards critical loads are not reserved to the territory of the EU. 
Abatement targets should also be acknowledged by the EU for receptor zones outside the EU 
inasmuch as deposits depend on EU emissions. Since several sources located in member states 
of the EU have a joint impact on these foreign receptor zones, deposits markets can be 
developed for them as well. Such markets should be placed under the authority of EU 
executive institutions, since this issue engages the responsibility of the EU towards foreign 
countries. 
For this market of deposition allowances there is a specific problem to solve with 
regard to how trading is combined with zoning. There are two possible solutions: 
• one is to only authorise transactions between sources generating deposits within the same 
receptor zones; in that case, there will be as many markets of the second type as there are 
receptor zones; if there exist n unit zones in Europe, a source would have to operate on (at 
most) n + 1 markets (the n deposit zones markets and the EU wide market of nationally 
allocated emissions allowances); 
• the other option is to define offset rates to organise trades between emissions generating 
deposits in the various zones; in that case, the emissions market is EU wide, with a 1 to 1 
32 
rate of exchange, and the deposits one is Europe wide, with differentiated rates of 
exchange; a further difference is linked to the initial allocation of allowances: each system 
has its own logic of distribution; this offset solution is not explored further, since we have 
chosen to develop our proposals on the basis of the first option. 
The use of a pollutants transportation model such as EMEP cannot be avoided, nor can 
the mapping of critical loads for achieving the initial allocation of deposit allowances. 
Existing modelling forecasts actual deposition (in emissions units) and maps the 5-percentile 
critical loads (also in emissions units). For each zone, we can then deduce the gap between the 
two (in emissions unit), as well as the authorised amount given by a 60% reduction. Thanks to 
the EMEP matrix of transport of pollutants, it is possible to proportionally attribute total 
deposits by zones to individual emission sources and so calculate the allocation of deposit 
allowances to sources. On the other hand, agreed national emission ceilings are supposed to be 
allocated to national sources, in each country, according to some national criterion, whichever 
they choose (grandfathering being the most probable). 
The following example illustrates the way this solution might work. It is based on the 
assumption that trading between deposit allowances linked to different receptor zones is 
forbidden. Hence there are several European zone markets in which EU sources have to 




• Given a system with 7 sources of pollutant emissions: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, and 
4 receptor zones: R1, R2, R3, R4. 
• Given the two types of allowance markets: to be permitted to emit one unit of pollutant, a 
source has to have one emission allowance Pe, and one deposit allowance Pd  for each 
deposit zone Ri. When the deposit is localised on R1, the deposit allowance will be indexed 
Pd1 (Pd2 on R2, Pd3 on R3, and Pd4 on R4). 
• The emission allowances can be traded among all sources, even though the deposit ones 
can only be traded between sources having emissions falling on the same receptor Ri. 
• Given a total quota of 60 units of allowed emissions, distributed between sources as 
60 emission allowances: 60 Pe. 
• Considering a receptor zone R1, the EMEP matrix of pollutants transport involves 
3 sources (S1, S2, S3) of concern for this zone. 
• S4, S5, S6, S7 emissions do not have any impact on R1. 
• The reduction in deposits on R1 required to reach 60% gap closure, is a reduction in 
emissions of 8 units. Up to now, S1 has emitted 16 units of pollutant, S2 : 12 ; and S3 : 4, 
giving a total of 32. 
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• Given a proportional distribution of the reduction efforts, S1 will have to reduce its 
emissions by 4 units, S2 by 3, and S3 by 1. This means that S1 is allocated 12 Pd1, S2 9 Pd1, 
and S3 3 Pd1. 










shows the pollutant transports from their emission location
 
Figure 3: An example of SO2 transport with 7 sources and 4 receptor zones 
 
For R1, this allows: 
 S1 (12 Pd1 ; 18 Pe):  - to emit 12 units of pollutant and to sell 6 Pe, or, 
   - to buy 6 Pd1 and then emit 18 units of pollutant. 
 S2 (9 Pd1 ; 3 Pe) : - to emit 3 units of pollutant and to sell 6 Pd1, or, 
  - to buy 6 Pe and then emit 9 units of pollutant. 
 S3 (3 Pd1 ; 4 Pe) : - to emit 3 units of pollutant and to sell 1 Pe, or, 
  - to buy 1 Pd1 and then emit 4 units of pollutant. 
 
In fact, this double system of allowances may be more practical that it seems at first. 
On the deposit markets, there is a limited number of potential partners. They may be well-
known to each potential participant. Thus, the problem of search for potential partners would 
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be rather easy to overcome, thus limiting this component of transaction costs. But the market 
could be too thin, making it difficult to find partners willing to exchange. Another obstacle is 
the possibility of strategic interference amongst competitors (market power). If these potential 
difficulties are confirmed as having practical relevance, they strengthen the argument in 
favour of some larger grouping of unit zones. 
When potential traders know their trading opportunities on the deposit markets, they 
can then adjust their strategy on the other market, that for emissions. The emissions allowance 
market provides large opportunities for exchange for suppliers and buyers. No specific 
additional constraints are necessary on this market since the deposits constraints are tackled by 
the other type of markets. 
 
A double system of allowances
Emission constraint
Initial allocation of emission
allowances to plant j
 based on national quotas
Pej
Trading with other plants on
one single EU market
Deposition constraint





needed on zone i
EMEP Pdij (allowances to j of emitting on i)









Figure 4: The running of a double coupled system of allowances 
 
The Figure 4 shows that, with the help of the initial allocation and of trading, a source j 
has to get the same amount of Pej and Pdij to be permitted to emit that amount of SO2. 
The heterogeneous combination of two types of allowances can be seen as an incentive 
to trade. Either participants have both half-allowances (emission and deposits) permitting 
them to emit, or they only have a certain amount of one type of allowance. In this second case, 
it is always more interesting for them to sell their unused half-allowances or to find the other 
half than to stay in their present position. 
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The next two variants differ as regards the rule for the initial allocation of allowances 
and the type of incentive mechanism incorporated to make reaching critical loads targets more 
attractive to plants (variant 1) and governments (variant 2). 
 
2.2.2. An integrated system incorporating an auctioned secondary market for unusable 
allowances 
Here, an allocation of emission allowances to individual sources (plants) by national 
governments is calculated on the basis of national ceilings and allocation criteria chosen by 
these governments. This gives the Potential Emission Allowances PPej. The subsequent 
deposits from each source for each receptor zone are assessed with the help of the EMEP 
model. In the meantime, the 60% abatement target is used as the basis for a calculation of an 
overall deposit cap for each receptor zone. These zone deposit caps are then distributed 
proportionately to the sources responsible for the deposits, also using EMEP. This gives the 
Potential Deposit Allowances PPdij. The two allocations are translated in comparable terms 
(units of emissions) for each source by using the vector that describes how emissions from a 
source translate into deposits in the different receptor zones (say 10% on R1, 30% on R3, 25% 
on R11, and so on). Each source will have a different dispersion vector according to its 
location. 
At this moment, for each source, two different amounts of potential emission 
allowances are considered, the direct "emission" one PPej and the one derived from "deposits" 
PPdj., with PPdj being equal to the sum of PPdij. The lower value of acceptable emissions is 
then selected, in order to satisfy the more binding constraint. On this basis an actual quota of 
emissions allowances Puj is acknowledged to source j. We may call them "usable and tradable 
allowances". They can alternatively be used directly, i.e. to cover actual emissions of the 
source, or traded, if sources take measures to abate their emissions under this quota. 
At the same time, individual sources (plants) are given an extra amount of potential 
allowances Ptj responding to the difference between the less binding constraint (the emission 
or deposit one, it depends on the locations) and the more binding one. This extra amount 
cannot be used directly but only for trading if authorised trades can take place. We may call 
them "unusable, tradable allowances". The working of the mechanism could be as follows: 
• Just like the amount of "usable and tradable allowances", the amount of "tradable, unusable 
allowances" may evolve with time, following transactions of both types of allowances. At 
any moment, the net amount of "usable allowances" is defined by the level of the most 
binding of the two types of potential allowances (emission and deposit), and the amount of 
unusable allowances can be calculated as the difference between the two types (emission 
and deposit) of potential allowances. 
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• A financial mechanism could be set up to facilitate the valuation of unusable allowances on 
a market, i.e. they may feed an auction market organised by the authorities on behalf of 
sources. The financial product of auctions would be refunded to the source entitled to it. 
This "last resort market" would be open to any source, but the buyers would be subject to 
the same constraints of usage that were previously described for all sources. 
• Unusable "deposit" allowances can only be bought for a use touching the same deposit 
zones in Europe as the ones affected by the original use by the seller. In the latter case, it 
means that individual transactions involving deposit allowances have to be checked as 
regards the deposit zones of each trading parts, as it is the case for any exchange of "usable 
and tradable" allowances. For instance, if 100 tons of unusable deposit allowances are sold 
by a source to another, what is really sold is a deposition right reflecting the structure of 
deposits of the seller, say 20 tons in Z1, 30 tons in Z2, 50 tons in Z3. So the entitlement 
obtained through the purchase of 100 "unusable deposits allowances" is a vector D1,2,3 (20, 
30, 50). It is possible that the buyer cannot use the whole spectrum of what it buys, due to 
its own different location and different structure of deposits from its emissions. For 
instance it may not be able to use more allowances than 30 for Z2, though it had to buy the 
whole package of 100 tons to get the 30. 
Let us give an illustration. Given two sources (plants) S1 and S2, belonging to 
neighbouring countries, having deposits on the same receptor zones. The potential emission 
allowances quota to S1 is set at 1,000 units, though the deposit one would potentially reach 
1,100: S1E = 1,000 ; S1D = 1,100. For S2, S2E = 900 and S2D = 700. Two cases have to be 
considered: (a) the emission formula is more binding than the deposit one; (b) the deposit 
formula is more binding than the emission one. 
(a) In the initial state, S1  possesses 100 extra unusable deposit allowances and S2 has got the 
right to buy and use them, since S1 and S2 have deposits on the same receptor zones. The 
result is now that S'1E = 1,000 ; S'1D = 1,000. For S2, S'2E = 900 and S'2D = 800. S1 will be 
entitled to emit 1,000 tons and S2 800, for a total amount of 1,800, which meets both 
emission and deposit constraints. 
(b) This case is illustrated by the position of S2 in the previous case. Even after buying 100 
unusable deposit allowances from S1, S2 still has 100 unusable emissions allowances it 
could resell to any other source in the EU, without any specific regulatory constraint. Such 
a trade may only be of interest to sources more constrained by emission requirements than 
by deposit ones. 
With such a system, all constraints are taken into account without compromising the 
political commitments behind national ceilings agreed upon in the Oslo Protocol. At the same 
time, this mechanism generates a general market for allowances alongside bilateral trades, 
with two goals: 
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• giving additional flexibility and safety to sources, and avoiding strategic retention of 
allowances; the mechanism would be similar to auctions organised by the EPA in the USA; 
any source looking for allowances and not finding them through bilateral trade may enter 
this recourse market; 
• facilitating the emergence of a public price of reference for SO2 allowances, and 
authorising comparisons between what is going on in various national markets; when 
transactions are bilateral, they can be kept private, with no information released about 
prices paid; the only information that authorities should be entitled to register are the 
quantities of allowances being exchanged; with the creation of this market, price becomes a 
public good that helps each individual source to shape its strategy. 
 
An integrated system with an auctioned secondary market
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Initial allocation of emission




60% reduction in the gap
between actual deposits




generates usable and tradable
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generates unusable but tradable
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Figure 5: The first variant of an integrated system with an auctioned market 
 
Figure 5 shows that at each moment a source has a certain amount of "usable and 
tradable" allowances and another amount of "unusable and tradable" allowances. Through 
trading, it can rearrange both type of assets. 
 
2.2.3. A system incorporating compensations for States 
Here, two steps for the initial allocation are still considered, but to some extent they reverse 
the previous solution. One begins by considering current emissions from sources (plants) and 
simulates, thanks to EMEP, the subsequent deposits for each basic receptor zone. Two cases 
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are then possible. If the critical loads are not exceeded, the source is credited with a "deposit 
allowance" Di corresponding to its current emissions. If the critical loads are exceeded, the 
target of 60% closure of the gap between deposits and critical loads is used to calculate a 
deposit cap Di for the receptor zone; this cap is allocated proportionately to each source 
having deposits in the zone. This defines the first formula for determining the potential SO2 
deposit allowances PPdij to be received by each individual source j (plants). Consider this 
example: one source S1 has 3 tonnes of deposits on a receptor zone Z1, for which the cap is not 
exceeded, and 8 tonnes of deposits on Z2 where the cap is exceeded. Then S1 will first receive 
3 Pd1. If Z2 is receiving a total amount of excess deposits of 20 tonnes and responsibility of S1 
for this is 5%, it will also receive: 
{8 - [(20 x 60 %) x 5 %]} = 7.4 Pd2. 
So the first potential deposit allocation of S1 is:  PPd1 = 3 Pd11 + 7.4 Pd21 
Then the total amount, ED, of such SO2 deposition allowances to EU sources is 
calculated to test the compatibility of this allocation with the Oslo Protocol, as regards 
abatement commitments expressed in national ceilings: 
ED =  ∑i,j PPdij  for each source j and zone i 
An EU cap on emissions, ET, is also calculated as the sum of SO2 emissions 
compatible with agreed national ceilings. If ED ≤ ET, the first allocation is actually 
implemented for plants, since it satisfies at the same time the total EU cap and the critical 
loads target for each European zone. If on the contrary ED > ET, some additional restriction is 
needed. It can be argued that a proportional reduction on the first formula of allocation of 
allowances will be the appropriate solution for every individual source. For instance, if ED = 
1.2 x ET, the actual initial allocation of S1 will be: 
Pd1 =  [(3/1.2 Pd1 ; 7.4/1.2 Pd2)]  =  (2.5 Pd1 ; 6.15 Pd2) 
 
Such a procedure fits well an integrated EU political context, since member countries 
are supposed to transfer their national quotas to the EU, so as to obtain a global EU wide cap. 
The prominent role given to the critical loads targets expresses the same equilibrium. But 
under what conditions will this solution be acceptable to governments? Some countries will 
certainly see their actual quota reduced when compared to the agreed national ceilings in the 
Oslo Protocol or to the first variant considered above. It seems quite natural to envisage some 
mechanism of financial compensation. It has been proposed to compensate governments 




A system with compensations for States
Deposition constraint
Current deposition on zone i
DCi
If critical load i > DCi If criticalload i< DCi








to plant j of emitting on i
Emission constraint
National quotas Qn are
added into one EU quota
∑n Qn = ET∑i,j PPdi
j
 = ED
ED < ET ED > ET
Allocation
Pdij = PPdij
(ED - ET)/ET = a
Allocation
Pdij = (1 - a)PPdij
Trading with other plants





∑i, jnPdijIf Qn = 




Figure 6: A second variant of an integrated system with compensation for states 
 
What should be the base for this compensation? Obviously, compared to the Oslo 
Protocol, some countries are going to see their allocation improved and others worsened. It 
will be easy to see who has to be compensated and who has to pay compensation. In the 
normal ordinary running of allowance trading, the amount of the compensation could be 
determined on the basis of the mean market price of allowances. Since this is the initial 
allocation that is being discussed now, there is still no observable market prices for 
allowances. They could be proxied by some estimate of marginal costs of meeting constraints 
on SO2 emissions. This solution might be empirically accepted on the basis of some field 
study, but it lacks logical consistency. Trading schemes find their justification in the fact that 
marginal costs are not appropriately known by central authorities, and may not even be 
adequately revealed to sources before the latter are dynamically confronted with a new 
context, including allowing trading opportunities! 
There is a conventional way around this issue, which is in the spirit of the Oslo 
Protocol. Since the breakthrough of this Protocol was only possible because the parties 
accepted some integrated assessment as a basis for elaborating a rather cost-effective 
international plan, parties should agree to calculate compensation using the same tool. The 
compensations table could then be calculated as the difference in national costs resulting from 
two allocations: the agreed national ceilings of the Protocol and the allocation resulting from 
the procedure that has been just described. 
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2.2.3. A comparative summary of the three trading schemes  
The three trading schemes we have just examined are supposed to meet the basic 
constraints of the SO2 European game as we have interpreted them. However, they are not 
identical in every respect and implement different institutional and political equilibria; they do 
not establish the same economic mechanisms either. A comparative approach may help to 
identify the specific pros and cons of each solution. Four general criteria are now considered: 
cost-effectiveness; achieving environmental targets; administrative ease; political 
acceptability. As a reference for the comparison, we also place the existing CAC regime in the 
comparative table. 
Table 2 provides a subjective and qualitative comparative assessment of the basic 
policy regimes discussed in the previous sections. Some critical features of the comparison are 
not easily caught in such a table, which is not a substitute for the detailed discussion of the 
previous sections. The general conclusion illustrated by this table is that some trade-off has to 
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emissions and trades; 
modelling used for each 
proposed trade for 
deposit allowances 
Provides incentive to 
accept the critical loads 
targets (compensations 
to governments) 
But political reluctance 
in respect to the idea of 
compensation among 
governments 
Table 2: A comparative, qualitative assessment of alternative schemes 
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2.3. About zoning and scaling 
The issue of zoning has been touched upon several times in this paper. This issue deserves 
consideration regarding the two alternative ways to achieve a zoning for trading. Two main 
problems need to be addressed: the first concerns the scale of receptor zones; the second 
concerns the way zones are defined. 
At one extreme, we have grid-cells, i.e. relatively small territorial units of 150 km X 
150 km. At the other extreme, we face one unique zone, the European territory concerned by 
the LRTAP Convention. The higher the scale, the more attractive the potential for economic 
efficiency gains from trading. The lower the scale, the more the market will take account of 
localised environmental differences, though the potential gains from trade will be lower. 
Maintaining practical viability with sufficient potential for economic efficiency gains should 
be considered the relevant criteria of choice for the "best" scale, not just having a complete 
guarantee about the environmental evolution of every small part of the European territory. If 
such an extreme requirement is imposed, it would be paying too much for environmental 
certainty. But how can we proceed in this direction? 
If the existing grid of 150 km X 150 km is to be maintained as a framework for 
organising allowance trading, defining a matrix of rates of exchanges (offset rates) between all 
zones is inescapable to find a sufficient flexibility. This was not the way explored in this 
article. We advocate to keep with  a 1 to 1 rate of exchange within homogeneous zones. In 
that case, the solution is to constitute a limited number of macro zones to give sources a 
sufficient margin of flexibility. 
There are two main possibilities for organising such macro zones. The first consists of 
setting a number of classes of excess over critical loads and to map the territory according to 
these classes. Two territorial units belonging to the same class may not be adjacent. Allowing 
a 1 to 1 rate of exchange within each equivalence class is appealing, since emissions will have 
a broadly similar effect on the environment, though the risk of having hot-spot problems, with 
an unduly large concentration of pollutants in some places, cannot be excluded. So it may be 
useful and prudent to introduce some restriction. 
This is provided by the alternative way of designing zoning - identifying homogeneous 
geographical zones i.e. zones having a geographical unity in terms of contiguity and at the 
same time the same broad level of excess of deposits over critical loads. Several adjacent cells 
with the same sensitivity to deposition could be joined in a single macro zone. Such a 
grouping extends the trading possibilities between deposits allowances. Trade would be 
allowed only between sources having emissions falling into the same macro zone. Figure 7 is 
an illustration of this conception. 
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• As a first step, zoning is roughly defined. Sources having emissions falling on a macro 
zone of the same sensitivity can trade. For instance, sources from which emissions are 
falling on (R1, R2, R3, R10, R11, R12, R19) can trade deposits allowances between 
themselves. In the same way, sources having emissions falling on (R51, R58, R59) can 
trade together; 
• Conversely, sources generating deposits onto R8 would not be allowed to trade with 
those having deposits on R58. An increase in deposits in R8 cannot be compensated 
for by a reduction in R58, due to compliance with critical loads. 
• Sources belonging to different macro zones but placed in the same class of 
environmental excess are not allowed to trade; as mentioned above, this could generate 
hot-spots of concentration of pollutants. Zone Z1 could be made up of  R4, R5, R6, 
R13, R14, R16, R21, R22, R23, R24, R28, R29, R30, R31, R32 as an homogeneous 
trading zone. 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 R16
R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 R24
R25 R26 R27 R28 R29 R30 R31 R32
R33 R34 R35 R36 R37 R38 R39 R40
R41 R42 R43 R44 R45 R46 R47 R48
R49 R50 R51 R52 R53 R54 R55 R56





Figure 7: Example of adjacent zoning 
 
Such a grouping into macro zones can be made reversible. Since the ultimate target is 
formulated in terms of respecting critical loads for each basic territorial unit, progress in that 
direction may be supported by a transitional approach to the scaling of trading zones. The 
initial step would be organised on the basis of a limited number of macro zones, to give 
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sufficient economic flexibility according to the present state of emissions and national targets. 
Such macro zones would not constrain sources enough to ensure compliance with critical 
loads targets for each unit zone. At later stages, these zones could be scaled down. For 
example, we can divide each of the previous macro zone into several parts: 
  Z1 :  →   z1(R4, R5, R6, R13, R14), 
   →   z2(R21, R22, R28, R29, R30), 
   →   z3(R16, R23, R24, R31, R32) 
 and so on for any macro zone ... 
One critical point for the dynamics of scaling from an incentive viewpoint is that the 
future evolution of the grid should be communicated to participants well in advance so as they 
can elaborate strategic plans of compliance incorporating early adaptation. Otherwise the 
outcome could be very inefficient. For instance, mistakes in capital investment might be 
induced. The authorities might therefore announce that the existing zones would be narrowed 
five years later, and then again 10 years after. Plants could then elaborate strategies for 
complying with the constraints and benefiting from opportunities. Such announcements of 
changes in the scale of trading zones would limit the problem of hot spots from the start, 
because for every decision having a medium or long term time horizon, specifically for 
planning investments (desulphuring equipment, etc.), plant operators will have to take the 
announced changes into account. By the end of the process, the long run targets fixed by the 
Oslo Protocol, i.e. respective critical loads at the level of the grid-cell, will have to be met and 
this will give much less scope for trading. 
With respect to practical matters, what type of zoning may reasonably be considered in 
an initial step? It seems that defining five trading macro zones in which critical loads are 
exceeded may make sense on both economic and ecological grounds. For instance, this is the 
recommendation proposed by Bailey, Gough et Millock (1994). Here macro zones are made 
of a grouping of unit zones having adjacent sensitivity. One procedure, suggested by these 
authors, is to set five classes of acid sensitivity and to classify each grid cell according to this 
gradation. Sensitivity x is defined by the value of critical loads, i.e. as the amount of acid 
deposits that a zone can absorb without being significantly damaged. x is expressed in 
keqH+km²yr-1. The five classes are as follows: 
(x ≤ 20) ; (20 < x ≤ 40) ; (40 < x ≤ 80) ; (80 < x ≤ 160) ; (160 < x) 
An alternative approach is to classify grid cells according to the level of excess 
deposits. This leads to another mapping. The following maps give an illustration of these 
classifications. Map 1 shows how five sensitivity classes are split into macrozones. This 
« sensitivity » classification is not very satisfactory: two areas classified in the same sensitivity 
class may suffer unequal damage due to additional deposits; marginal damage depends not 
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only on sensitivity levels but also on basic deposits received by zones in excess over critical 
loads. This is a reason why we suggest to consider the second type of zoning based on excess 
deposits over critical loads. With five classes of excess deposits, we can distinguish five 
critical macrozones surrounded by large areas where critical loads are not exceeded. These are 
given in Map 2. 
These maps convincingly show that drawing macro zones is not an entirely arbitrary 
exercise. By accepting some kind of "sacrifice"22 for a few cells, it is possible to identify 
homogeneous zones of a large scale. It should be noticed that significant superficies are not 
really affected by acid deposition. These zones have deposits that do not exceed critical loads. 
The 60% abatement constraint will not be binding for them, but only respecting critical loads. 




Allowance trading can be economically and environmentally advantageous when compared to 
a homogeneous tightening of emission standards. In the case of a EU SO2 trading scheme, the 
system would incorporate a double institutional constraint (national overall targets, a target of 
a 60% reduction in the excess of deposits over the 5-percentile critical loads). This could 
make it more complicated than imagined at first sight, and entail significant organisational 
costs, thus limiting the incentives given to companies to commit themselves to trading. This 
may be an obstacle. Incorporating a EU trading scheme into the framework of the Oslo 
Protocol would be a delicate operation, needing to avoid several obstacles. The design of the 
instrument should seek to match the political compromise established by this Protocol, 
between a more federal-oriented, integrated approach and a more national-oriented one. Three 
possible solutions have been considered. Firstly, a double, coupled, system of allowances in 
which basic operators have to gather the same amount of the two sorts of allowances to obtain 
the right to emit the corresponding amount of SO2. Secondly, an integrated system giving due 
account to both constraints with the introduction of a distinction between "usable and 
tradable" allowances and "unusable and tradable" ones. Thirdly, an integrated system focused 
on deposition allowances trading, equilibrated by financial compensation between 
governments. 
                                                 
22.- Macrozoning does not exclude the risk that, in some areas, deposits may increase or may not decrease, 
though a significant decrease will be achieved in other parts of the same macrozone. Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that the target of a 60% abatement rate of excess over critical loads does not directly refer to damage. In 
places where critical loads may be slightly exceeded, the target is the same as in places where the excess is of a 
greater magnitude 
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The most critical point for implementing these solutions will be to find an agreement 
on the simplification of zoning. Drawing five homogenous zones in Europe, within which 
trading could be free, is the way we suggest. Such an approach would mean that an individual 
source should operate in a maximum of five different zones markets, depending on the 
dispersion of pollutants it emits. This construct relies on the capacity of EMEP to reliably 
model the transport of pollutants from sources to receptors. 
One important advantage of a SO2 trading scheme might be to allow a better 
management of the timing of progress towards the ultimate goal of respecting critical loads 
everywhere in Europe. This idea of transition can be understood both at the global EU level, 
where allowance trading may help progress by reducing the economic cost of the trajectory, 
and at the utility level, where the new flexibility permits an optimisation of the timing of 
investment devoted to the abatement of pollutants. Depending on their specific situation, not 
all plants will be obliged to achieve their adaptation in the same way, at the same pace. This 
can be contrasted with the usual requirement of CAC. 
Due to the novelty of the instrument in Europe, it does not seem appropriate to extend 
the trading mechanism to other sectors (all large combustion plants, refineries) from the 
outset. A risk of destabilisation of sectoral economic conditions may raise strategies of 
protection which are not those being aimed at. Keeping such an extension to a second step, 
after seven or ten years of initial experiment within the power generation sector, would allow 
the experience gained to be exploited in extending the scheme to other sectors. 
Finally, emissions trading should not be designed and considered as a pure application 
of textbook economic theory, nor as an end in itself, but as the instrument of a cost-effective 
institutional evolution, achieving a political transition towards greater integration of 
environmental policy. As Baron and Hourcade (1993) have said in the context of CO2, "hybrid 
schemes", compromising political rationale and specific institutional dynamics at the national 
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